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Note
Clear Control: An Antitrust Analysis
of Clear Channel's Radio and Concert Empire
Adam J. van Alstyne*
No, you are not imagining it; the same mediocre song is on
every radio station. The music promotion industries of radio
and concerts were significantly consolidated over the last dec-
ade.' In 2000, the industries wed when Clear Channel, the
dominant parent company in radio consolidation, purchased
SFX, the largest concert promoter conglomerate.2 Today, a few
large corporations control most commercial radio and concert
promotion firms. Concentration in these industries, however, is
not just about what songs you hear on the radio and what con-
certs come to your town. Advertising in these media-driven in-
dustries generates billions of dollars annually.3
Consolidation in the music promotion industries allows
firms to rapidly change operations to realize economic efficien-
cies. These efficiencies, however, are not always in the long-
term interests of the industries. This Note applies a rule of rea-
son antitrust analysis to the consolidation of radio broadcasting
and concert promotions, and the vertical integration of the two
industries. This Note contends that federal regulation of radio
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001,
Grinnell College. The author would like to thank his family for their love and
support; Professor Brett McDonnell for his advice and feedback on this Note's
formative drafts; the Staff and Board of Volumes 87 and 88 of the Minnesota
Law Review for their diligent efforts; thanks in particular to Jared Hager, Jim
Toomey, P. Joshua Hill, and Sten-Erik Hoidal.
1. See discussion infra Part III. Record labels are also consolidated but
that is not discussed here. For a brief discussion of record label consolidation,
see Andrew Marton, Requiem for the Record: The Grammy Win by the 0
Brother Soundtrack Is Another Sign that the Original Concept of the Rock Al-
bum Is Dying, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 23, 2002, at D1.
2. CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 2001 10-K 35 (2001).
3. Another major concern arising out of the consolidation of media indus-
tries is the issue of editorial control and distribution of thought. See generally
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001).
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station ownership fails to address vertical integration in the
music promotion industry, and that agency tendency toward
deregulation reduces competition and diversity to the detri-
ment of the public. Additionally, this Note addresses the short-
comings of proposed legislation addressing vertical integration
in the music promotion industries and offers groundwork for
potential solutions. Part I provides a brief overview of the his-
tory of federal radio regulation. Part II introduces a few anti-
trust principles applicable to an analysis of the music promo-
tions industries' consolidations. Part III traces the sources and
extent of consolidation in the radio and concert industries, in-
cluding the 2000 Clear Channel-SFX merger. Part III also pro-
vides an overview of the Competition in Radio and Concert In-
dustries Act, ' Congress's recent attempt to regulate the
consolidation and anticompetitive practices in the concert pro-
motion and radio industries. Part IV analyzes the competitive
efficiencies and harms of consolidation in radio, concert promo-
tions, and the vertical integration of the two concentrated in-
dustries. Part V analyzes the role of government intervention
and proposes a framework to regulate the vertical integration
of radio and concert promotions.
The conclusions this paper draws are not limited in appli-
cability to the merger of radio stations. With the June 2003
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) media ownership
regulations5 currently under an emergency stay, and close scru-
tiny, when lawmakers and courts evaluate the proposed rules,
they should consider the impact that media conglomeration has
on closely related industries. As the Third Circuit acknowl-
edged in justifying the court's September 3, 2003, order staying
4. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act, S. 221, 108th Cong.
(2003); H.R. 1763, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2691, 107th Cong. (2002).
5. The new media ownership rulings allow one parent company to con-
trol the television signal of up to forty-five percent of television's total national
audience. See Jim Landers, FCC Votes Along Party Lines to Relax Most Media
Ownership Rules, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 3, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL
56750600. The rulings also allow media conglomerates in the largest cities to
own media across platforms, i.e., radio, newspaper, and television, by loosen-
ing cross-ownership bans, a policy rejected by Congress under the 1996 Tele-
communications Act. See id. Overall, the new rulings promote greater integra-
tion across industries and greater editorial control in conglomerates' hands.
See id. The proposed rules are located in the Commission's 2002 biennial re-
view of its broadcast ownership rules. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). For a discussion
of the impact of the proposed rules on radio see infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
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the new media ownership rules, the "alleged harms from indus-
try consolidation [are argued to] be widespread and irreversible
if they occurred. '
With the potential for irreparable harm, examining the
impact media consolidation has on closely related industries is
important to insure ownership regulations will operate
soundly. As Senator John McCain stated to the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "the broad-
cast radio industry was the 'miner's canary'. . . [i]t alerted [the
committee] to the growing consolidation and vertical integra-
tion in media."7 As a result of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, the radio broadcast industry operates without any national
limits on ownership." The experiences within the radio and con-
cert promotions industries can serve as an example for the
regulation of other industries by illustrating the flaws in failing
to account for how one industry's consolidation affects other
closely related industries.
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL RADIO REGULATION
A. BIRTH OF RADIO REGULATION
The public owns radio bandwidth; thus, the radio industry
has been government regulated since its inception.9 The gov-
ernment must limit the number of stations that operate within
the confines of the bandwidth to prevent signal interference.' °
The Radio Act of 1927" created an administrative board to
6. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896, at
*1 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (per curiam) (granting motion to stay the effective
date of the FCC's new ownership rules pending judicial review).
7. Media Ownership (Radio Consolidation): Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen.
McCain, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.).
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-104, § 202(a), 110
Stat. 56, 110.
9. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1943); see
also Carl J. Friedrich & Evelyn Steinberg, Congress and the Control of Radio-
Broadcasting, I, 37 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 797 (1943); Michael Ortner, Note,
Serving a Different Master-The Decline of Diversity and the Public Interest in
American Radio in the Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 139, 141-42 (2000) (discussing how early radio
regulations were promulgated to reduce conflicting signals).
10. See Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 213 (citing JOHN H. MORECROFT,
PRINCIPLES OF RADIO COMMUNICATION 355-402 (3d ed. 1933); FREDERICK
EMMONS TERMAN, RADIO ENGINEERING 593-645 (2d ed. 1937)).
11. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
629
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oversee radio stations' operations by promoting access to the
airwaves and reducing interference on the dial. 12 The Commu-
nications Act of 193413 established the FCC and granted the
FCC oversight of licensing radio stations. 4 The FCC's purpose
is to ensure radio operations meet the public interest." In par-
ticular, the FCC will grant a license if it finds that "public in-
terest, convenience, and necessity would be served." 6
In 1938, the FCC limited station ownership to promote the
public interest and encourage diversity and competition. 17 The
Supreme Court's position on this action has been to note that
while the FCC "does not have power to enforce the antitrust
laws as such, it [was] permitted to take antitrust policies into
account in making licensing decisions pursuant to the public-
interest standard."' 8 The FCC's decision to limit concentration
of ownership was consistent with the Court's declaration that
the "[First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the wid-
est possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."' 9
B. FCC's EARLY ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH VERTICAL
INTEGRATION: CHAIN BROADCASTING
Also in 1938, the FCC began the chain broadcasting hear-
ings2° to investigate network monopolization of radio program-
§ 151 (2000)).
12. Ortner, supra note 9, at 142-43.
13. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
14. Id.
15. See id. § 303 (commanding the FCC to do several acts as "public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires").
16. Id. § 309(a); see also id. § 310(d) (governing license transfers under the
same "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard) (amended 2002).
Congress's extensive regulatory guidelines in the 1934 Act suggest that the
public interest in radio operations needs protection from market forces. The
Court noted in 1953, "[E]ncouragement of competition [is not] considered the
single or controlling reliance for safeguarding the public interest." FCC v. RCA
Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953).
17. Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast
Stations in Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 66 Fed. Reg.
63,986, 63,986 (Dec. 11, 2001) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter
Rules and Policies].
18. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795-96 (1978)
(citing United States v. Radio Corp. Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959); Nat'l
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-24 (1943)).
19. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
20. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 193-94. Chain broadcasting is the "si-
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ming.2' The chain broadcasting hearings created regulations
that outlawed network business practices that hindered entry
into the national broadcasting industry or that discouraged lo-
cal programming.22 In 1943, the Supreme Court upheld the• 23
regulations, allowing the FCC to limit network ownership to
one affiliate station in a market and even to prevent network
ownership in markets where it would foreclose competition.24
The Court recognized that Congress granted the FCC broad
powers to respond to evolving problems in the industry, which
included the power to regulate vertical market issues.25
The FCC repealed the chain broadcasting rules that ap-
plied to radio in 1977,26 and began relaxing ownership restric-
tions. By 1992, one parent company could own up to four sta-
tions (two AM and two FM) in a market; however, a parent
company with over a quarter of the market share was pre-
sumed against the public interest.
27
C. RADIO DEREGULATION AND THE
1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
At Congress's cue, the FCC has begun to favor the open
market. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act)2 dra-
matically deregulated radio ownership by directing the FCC to
multaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected
stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(9) (2000).
21. The FCC wanted to ensure that local owners could broadcast
programs besides the network feed. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 198-99. The
FCC recognized that networks offered better services to a wider audience, but
determined that this alone did not entitle network policies to blanket
commission approval. Id. at 198.
22. For example, the networks could not enforce penalty clauses against
station owners broadcasting a competing product. Id. at 200. The rules also
outlawed territorial exclusivity clauses that prevented networks from selling
programs to other stations in the same area. Id. These clauses could prevent a
program's broadcast in an entire region if an affiliate declined to broadcast the
program. Id. The commission also modified the use of network option times-
clauses giving the national network control of a local station's broadcast for up
to twenty-four hours, under advance notification. Id. at 202-03.
23. Id. at 224-25.
24. Id. at 208.
25. See id. at 219.
26. Review of Commission Rules and Regulatory Policies Concerning
Network Broadcasting by Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, 63
F.C.C. 2d 674 (1977).
27. See Rules and Policies, supra note 17, at 63,987.
28. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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remove the national limits on station ownership. Under the
1996 Act, a parent company can own up to eight stations in
some markets." Congress removed the limit on national radio
ownership to promote competition by enabling centralized
broadcasters to offer better content and enhancing radio's abil-
ity to compete with new media.31
29. Id. § 202(a). The purpose of the 1996 Act was to "promote competition
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality ser-
vices for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Id. at pmbl.
30. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A). The size of the market dictates the limits on local
ownership. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)-(D). The FCC has discretion to allow an owner to
exceed the limit, however, if it "will result in an increase in the number of ra-
dio broadcast stations in operation" Id. § 202(b)(2).
31. Anna Wilde Mathews, Over the Borderline: In San Diego, Legal Quirks
Help a Radio Empire: Clear Channel Blankets Market with a Mix of Stations
in the U.S. and Mexico: Using Leverage with Ad Buyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4,
2002, at Al. Drafts of the 1996 Act included a media ownership provision that
also removed television ownership limits and allowed for extensive cross-
media ownership. See Communications Act of 1995, H.R. 1555, 104th Cong.
(1995). Many legislators feared a centralized media monopoly. See 141 CONG.
REC, E1571, E1571-72 (1995) (statement of Rep. Markey) (stating that a draft
of the bill's "drastic and indiscriminate elimination of mass media ownership
rules proposed... would eviscerate the public interest principles of diversity
and localism .... It allows for the concentration of television, radio, cable and
newspaper properties in a way that will make Citizen Kane look like an un-
derachiever. . . ."). Representative Markey attacked the deregulation of televi-
sion as against the public interest and proposed amendments. Id. at E1571-
73. See also 141 CONG. REC. H8269, H8272-73 (1995) (statement of Rep.
Beilenson) (supporting Markey's television amendments, and mentioning that
the "bill would remove all limits on the number of radio stations a single com-
pany could own"); id. at H8276 (statement of Rep. Slaughter) ("Under the bill,
a single company can own a network station, a cable station, unlimited num-
bers of radio stations, and a daily newspaper, all in the same town."); id. at
H8291 (statement of Rep. Kaptur) ("I welcome some deregulation to create
competition and diversity in these monopolistic industries. However, deregula-
tion is fine. No regulation is anti-competitive and anti-democratic."). Thus, as
a political compromise, Congress revised most ownership provisions to prevent
concentration of ownership across media formats, but retained the permissive
radio ownership provisions. See Eric Boehlert, One Big Happy Channel?,
SALON.COM, June 28, 2001, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/
06/28/telecom dereg/print.htm (stating that the amendments were "to appease
the White House's objections about unfair media concentration"); see also
President's Remarks on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 215, 216 (Feb. 8, 1996) (signing the bill into law,
President Clinton remarked, "This law also recognizes that with freedom
comes responsibility. Any truly competitive market requires rules. This bill
protects consumers against monopolies. It guarantees the diversity of voices
our democracy depends upon....").
632
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D. FCC RADIO OWNERSHIP REGULATION SINCE THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The current FCC policy on media ownership is quixotic in
its struggle between encouraging open markets to generate ef-
ficiencies and regulating ownership to insure diverse media.
Pursuant to the 1996 Act, the FCC reviews the media owner-
ship laws biennially to determine if they still serve the public
interest.32 This review includes an evaluation of local radio
ownership regulations. In 1998, the FCC introduced an interim
system that flagged mergers, which if approved, would create a
particularly high concentration in a market's advertising reve-
nue.33 The system backlogged mergers.34 The FCC's 2001 in-
terim Local Radio Ownership Policy goal was to "develop a new
framework that will be more responsive to current marketplace
realities while continuing to address [the FCC's] core public in-
terest concerns of promoting diversity and competition."35
As part of this new framework, the FCC debated whether
section 202(b) of the 1996 Act simplified the review process of
the impact that radio mergers have on local markets.36 Section
202(b) removed language in local ownership regulations refer-
ring to audience share calculations that were "prima facie in-
consistent with the public interest., 37 The 1996 Act, however,
did not amend the public interest language in the 1934 provi-
sions that regulated station licenses and transfers. Did Con-
gress intend to forbid use of audience share calculations in
ownership regulations or simply strike the presumption that an
owner's high audience share was not in the public interest?
The June 2003 FCC media ownership rules address several
aspects of the local-level radio ownership regulations . Impor-
32. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110
Stat. 56, 111-12.
33. Rules and Policies, supra note 17, at 63,988.
34. Id.
35. Id. ("[The FCC's current] framework for analyzing proposed radio
combinations particularly has led to unfortunate delays that do not serve well
the interests of the agency, the parties, or the public.").
36. Id. For a discussion of the Act's effect on local ownership limits, see
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. Rules and Policies, supra note 17, at 63,987; see also supra note 27
and accompanying text.
38. See Rules and Policies, supra note 17, at 63,988; see also supra notes
15-16 and accompanying text (discussing the 1934 provisions).
39. See generally Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broad-
633
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tantly, the rules maintained the limits on local station owner-
ship.0 As part of the new FCC media ownership rulings, local
radio markets are measured differently." If implemented, the
rule will slow parent companies' ability to further concentrate
radio ownership in major cities.42
II. ANTITRUST CONCEPTS APPLICABLE TO RADIO
AND CONCERT PROMOTION CONSOLIDATION
An antitrust analysis often requires determining if a firm
has or would have market power, and thus, the ability to create
anticompetitive harms.43 This Part addresses the relevant legal
concepts as applied to the radio and concert promotions indus-
tries. First, this Part pinpoints the relevant market for radio
and concert promotion. Second, this Part examines the level of
judicial scrutiny that courts apply in antitrust cases. Third,
this Part explains the concepts of vertical integration and ty-
ing. Finally, this Part briefly outlines the rise and fall of
vertical integration in the courts.
A. THE RELEVANT MARKET FOR RADIO AND CONCERT
PROMOTIONS
Antitrust laws promote market competition and prevent
monopolistic harms.44 The FCC,45 the Department of Justice,46
cast Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Sta-
tions in Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286,
46,304-12 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
40. Id. at 46,304 (restricting both "the number of commercial radio sta-
tions in a service (AM or FM) that a party may own in a local market and the
number of stations overall"). For a discussion of these numerical limits on local
station ownership, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41. Arbitron Metro markets will now be used to define local markets be-
cause they represent a reasonable geographic market and are an industry
standard. Id. at 46,307 para. 190.
42. Jim Landers, FCC Votes Along Party Lines to Relax Most Media Own-
ership Rules, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 3, 2003, available at 2003 WL
56750600.
43. Market power is a concept important under the Sherman Act section 1
(agreements), section 2 (monopolization and actual monopolization), and the
Clayton Act section 3 (tying), and section 7 (mergers). Market power is "the
power to control prices or exclude competition." E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 27 (3d ed. 1998) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956)).
44. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
45. See discussion supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
46. The Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement branch can force
634
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and the Federal Trade Commission apply antitrust principles
in their oversight of radio.47 A proper antitrust analysis must
account for the business intricacies of the particular markete8
by defining the relevant product and geographic markets. 9
Market share does not always define the relevant product mar-
ket. The relevant product market could include several prod-
ucts that, because of cross-elasticity of demand, are reasonable
substitutes.0 Alternatively, the relevant product market can be
a defined submarket. 51
The relevant product market in station mergers is radio
advertising revenue.52 Station owners argue the relevant mar-
ket should include revenue from all forms of media advertis-
ing,53 because a broad definition decreases an owner's market
share, allowing ownership of more stations before raising anti-
trust concerns. 4 The antitrust agencies, however, have rejected
this proposal.55 In the popular concert touring industry, the
relevant market is revenue from promoting popular music con-
certs for a particular geographic market.56
the sale of stations to decrease ownership concentration in a market by condi-
tioning a merger's approval on a consent decree. See, e.g., Final Judgment of
Consent Decree, United States v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f6300/6354.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
47. Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust Per-
spective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 477
(2002) (explaining the FTC's role in granting antitrust clearance for the sale of
a radio station).
48. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962)
(noting that Congress desired mergers to be viewed in the context of the par-
ticular industry); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (stating that the "[dietermination of the relevant market
is a necessary predicate to finding a violation of the Clayton Act").
49. Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, both attempted and actual mo-
nopolization requires showing market power in a relevant market. See United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-76 (1966) (analyzing the factors
that determine a relevant market for antitrust matters).
50. Cross-elasticity of demand is a measure of products that are reason-
able substitutes and interchangeable with the product, and accordingly the
substitutes' demand should go up if the product's price rises or output de-
creases. See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325.
51. Id. (citing E.I. du Pont, 353 U.S. at 593-95 (1957)).
52. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 3, at 257.
53. This argument rests on principles of cross-elasticity of demand and
suggests that other media are adequate advertising substitutes. See supra
note 50 and accompanying text.
54. Leeper, supra note 47, at 482.
55. Id. at 483.
56. See New Park Entm't LLC v. Elec. Factory Concerts, Inc., No. 98-775,
2000 WL 62315, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2000); Compl. 37, Nobody in Par-
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B. THE RELEVANT STANDARD OF REVIEW
Typically, courts reviewing alleged antitrust violations re-
quire the plaintiff to prove anticompetitive effects under either
a rule of reason or a per se illegality standard . The rule of rea-
58
son standard applies to most allegations and requires a case-
by-case examination of the facts to weigh the procompetitive ef-
ficiencies against the anticompetitive harms.59 Per se illegality,
the less common standard, applies only to conduct that is
"manifestly anticompetitive." 60 A plaintiff prefers the per se
standard because the court will presume that the defendant's
conduct is anticompetitive.6 Conduct warrants per se review if
"the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put.
62
C. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND TYING
Vertical integration is the "combining of two or more verti-
cally related production processes under the auspices of one
ownership-and-control entity."63 This process occurred in the
ticular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (D. Colo. Aug. 6,
2001) (No. 01-N-1523) [hereinafter Clear Channel Complaint].
57. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) ("Both per se
rules and the Rule of Reason are employed 'to form a judgment about the com-
petitive significance of the restraint.") (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). A third standard, the "quick-look
rule of reason," emerged in the 1980s. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 770 (1999). The "quick-look rule of reason" applies to antitrust allegations
so likely to produce an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets (in the
form of obvious price or output restraints) that it only requires a cursory re-
view of the facts. Id. at 770-71.
58. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (noting that under the
rule of reason analysis, the fact finder examines whether the practice "imposes
an unreasonable restraint on competition").
59. See Am. Ad Mgmt. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 1996) (cit-
ing Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988)).
60. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). Per
se review is warranted only when the behavior has a "pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue." N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
61. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (stating that such agreements are
presumed to be unreasonable without inquiry into the resulting harm).
62. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979).
63. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY
328-29 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION].
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Clear Channel-SFX merger.64
Academics, initially led by the "Harvard School," believed
vertical integration was likely to produce anticompetitive ef-
fects. 65 The Harvard School is now widely rejected. 6  Today
there are two leading, but divergent schools of thought regard-
ing the economic impact of vertical integration: the "Chicago
School" and the "post-Chicago School." 67 The Chicago School
suggests vertical integration enhances market efficiency and
ultimately benefits the consumer.68 More guardedly, the post-
Chicago School advocates monitoring vertical' integration be-
cause under certain circumstances market leverage can harm
69
competition.
Tying is a business practice that occurs in vertically inte-
grated companies. Tying occurs when one product (tying prod-
uct) is sold on the condition that the buyer will purchase (or
agree not to purchase from a competitor) another product from
the seller (tied product). 70 Tying is harmful to the market when
it allows a firm to leverage its market power in one industry to
foreclose competition in another industry.7'
Traditionally, like most forms of vertical integration, tying
arrangements were illegal. 2 Now, however, the courts recog-
64. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the AMFM
merger and the simultaneous purchase of SFX).
65. Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the
New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 186-87 (2002) (noting that the Har-
vard School believed even as little as five percent of market power was enough
to leverage power-and this influenced the strict 1968 Merger Guidelines).
66. Id. at 187.
67. Id. at 202.
68. The Chicago School "was especially influential on antitrust policy in
the late 1970s and the 1980s." THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 63, at
328.
69. Yoo, supra note 65, at 186-87.
70. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). A footnote
clarifies that tying does not apply to a situation where the buyer is "free to
take either product by itself." Id. at n.4. According to the Court,
the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on differ-
ent terms.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
71. Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)
(stating "the essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of mo-
nopolistic leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to
expand his empire into the next").
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the Harvard
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nize that some tying arrangements can promote efficiency. 3
Today, the per se illegal standard of review is applied only to
tying arrangements in the presence of specific market condi-
tions.74 The courts have identified four elements to a per se ty-
ing agreement: "(1) the tying and the tied goods are two sepa-
rate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying
product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice
but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the tying ar-
rangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce."
7 5
D. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AS APPLIED BY THE COURTS
Courts have applied many antitrust statutes to vertically
integrated companies: sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and
sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.7 ' The legality of a vertically
integrated company turns on "(1) the purpose or intent with
which it was conceived, or (2) the power it creates and the at-
tendant purpose or intent."77 The Court has identified several
factors to determine whether vertical integration creates a
harmful monopoly, including the size and nature of the
markets involved and the likelihood of market power leverage,
which would foreclose competition.'
The vagueness of the Sherman Act's "monopoly" and "re-
straint of trade" concepts79 spurred Congress to pass the Clay-
ton Act. The Clayton Act's amendments sought to ensure courts
would find certain specific behavior to be an antitrust viola-
School's approach to vertical integration).
73. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 96-97 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (finding that the rule of reason analysis is applicable to software tying
arrangements and noting that evidence of efficiencies can be "direct and indi-
rect"). In some cases, tying generates desired efficiencies. JULIAN VON
RALINOWSHKI ET AL., 1 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 22.01 [2]
(2d ed. 2003) (positing a hypothetical where the buyer is interested in products
being shipped together or is interested in how products work together).
74. This is necessary because tying "not coerced by the heavy hand of
market power can serve the procompetitive functions of facilitating new entry
into certain markets." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S.
451, 488-89 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962)).
75. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 85 (citing Eastman Kodak Co., 504 at
461-62; Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 12-18).
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14, 18 (2002); THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra
note 63, at 332.
77. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
78. Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2002).
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tion.8° Section 3 of the Clayton Act specifically addressed tying:
it condemns contracts conditioned on the hindrance of competi-
tion.8' Section 7 of the Clayton Act regulates mergers that in-
volve vertical integration, although the Court has qualified
the provision by recognizing that it "does not render unlawful
all such vertical arrangements." 3
Antitrust merger regulations require agencies to predict
anticompetitive harms in their incipiency.84 The Department of
Justice in the 1980s, however, was not concerned with vertical
integration, and thus the subject is absent from the agency's
Merger Guidelines.5
III. RADIO AND CONCERT PROMOTION
CONSOLIDATION
A. RADIO OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION
Radio ownership drastically concentrated in 1997, one year
after the passage of the Telecommunications Act, as over "4,000
of the country's 11,000 radio stations changed hands.8 6 Con-
80. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355
(1922) ("The Clayton Act, as its title and the history of its enactment discloses,
was intended to supplement the purpose and effect of other anti-trust legisla-
tion, principally the Sherman Act of 1890."). Furthermore, "[tihe Clayton Act
sought to reach the agreements embraced within [the Sherman Act's] sphere
in their incipiency." Id. at 356.
81. Section 3 of the Clayton Act states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce... to lease
or make a sale ... or fix a price charged therefore, or discount from,
or rebate upon, such price, on the condition ... that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use ... commodities of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect... may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (2002).
82. See id. § 18.
83. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962). Section 7
"forbids only those [mergers] whose effect may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly, 'in any line of commerce in any sec-
tion of the country."' Id.
84. See id. at 317 (discussing Congress's aim to provide authority to stop
mergers early).
85. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 63, at 334; see also supra
note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the role of vertical integration as a
theory in the 1980s).
86. Jeff Leeds, Clear Channel's Dominance Obscures Promotions Conduit,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at C4. From March 1996 to March 2001 the total
number of station owners declined 25%. MASS MEDIA BUREAU, FEDERAL
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centration in ownership mostly resulted from mergers involv-
ing the fifty largest owners. 87 Notwithstanding the greater
number of owners in metro markets,88 the "top three broadcast-
ers control at least 60[%] of the stations in the top 100 markets
in the U.S."89 The sheer size of the biggest parent companies al-
lows those owners to control radio's content.8 0
Content control gives parent companies better access to
radio's main product: advertising airtime. 9' Stations generate
revenue from direct sales to advertisers who buy commercial
airtime during programming. 92 Station owners use demo-
graphic data to build music formats to appeal to target audi-
ences,93 and then market those audiences as tailored advertis-
ing options. 94 Not surprisingly, revenue share was highly
concentrated in 2001; in 60% of metro markets, one company
earned over 40% of the market's revenue.95
COMMUNICATIONS COMM., REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY, at 3 (Sept. 2001)
[hereinafter MASS MEDIA BUREAU] (noting a decrease in owners from 5133 to
3836), at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/policy/docs/radio0l.pdf.
87. MASS MEDIA BUREAU, supra note 86, at 3-4.
88. A parallel decline in ownership existed at the metro market level. Id.
at 7. In March 1996, a metro market averaged 13.5 owners; in March 2001,
the average fell to 10.3. Id. The top ten metro markets, however, averaged
25.4 owners in March 2001. Id.
89. Eric Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON.COM, Mar. 14, 2001, at
http://dir.salon.com/ent/feature2001/03/14/payola/index.html. As of March
2001, the largest five owners each held, in decreasing order, 972, 257, 210,
185, and 97 stations. MASS MEDIA BUREAU, supra note 86, at 4. These num-
bers do not include pending mergers. Id. at n.6.
90. According to one estimate "66.6 percent of people who listen to news
[on the radio] listen to stations that are owned by four companies." Alexandra
Marks, Media Future: Risk of Monopoly, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 19,
2002, at 3.
91. See Gene Epstein, A Happier Tune: A Stronger Economy Means More
Radio Advertising-Good News for Clear Channel's Shares, BARRON'S, May
13, 2002, at 27.
92. See id. (analyzing the effect of advertising dollars on Clear Channel's
earnings).
93. Mathews, supra note 31, at Al; see Duane Sprague, How To Use Radio
Better, http://www.dunningsprague.com/articles/radio.htm ("Radio is a tar-
geted medium because each radio station attracts a specific demographic
group based on the station format.").
94. Mathews, supra note 31, at Al (illustrating how a male-targeted radio
station is a more attractive market to sell automobiles).
95. Across all metro markets, the top two owners in a market averaged
72.8% of the market share and the top four averaged 92.8%. MASS MEDIA
BUREAU, supra note 86, at 9 chart 1. It should be noted that the national
analysis of local concentration is high because many small markets have few
stations each with very high market share. See id. at 6. Even in the fifty larg-
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There are signs radio's audience is eroding. In 2001, the
average listener had a radio on for twenty hours a week,
whereas in 1993, the average listener had a radio on for
twenty-two hours.96 One survey suggests listeners are tired of
hearing the same music.97 The National Association of Broad-
casters, possibly as a response to nervous owners concerned
about dwindling audiences, recently launched a quarter-
million-dollar promotional campaign touting broadcast radio's
diversity.9
Radio industry profits are increasing despite fewer listen-
ers.99 Owners use their stations' national infrastructure to ex-
ploit economies of scale and centralize operations.'00 In the
process radio has become "one of the biggest profit margin-
focused businesses in the eyes of Wall Street."10' To remain
highly profitable some stations have replaced a live local disc
est Arbitron markets, the average largest market share of a station is 36%, the
top two stations have 51%, and the top four stations collectively have 87%. Id.
Format diversity is another indicator of market concentration. Id. Format di-
versity measures the distinct types of music that are played on a radio station.
BIA, a company that provides data to the FCC, sorts these music types into
eighteen broad different formats. Id. at 7 n.14. In the aggregate, the smallest
metro markets have slightly increased the diversity of formats available to
their listeners, while the largest markets have slightly decreased the number
of formats. Id. The top ten markets have maintained around sixteen different
formats. Id. Research suggests, however, that the formats actually differ little
in musical content. See Peter DiCola & Kristin Thomson, Radio Deregulation:
Has It Served Citizens and Musicians?, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, Nov. 18,
2002, at 53-60, at http://www.futureofmusic.com/images/FMCradiostudy.pdf.
96. Damon Cline, Critics Say Radio Industry Drives Listeners Away,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 25, 2002, 2002 WL 26062145.
97. Id. (citing a Future of Music study where 76% of those surveyed would
prefer DJs to select songs, 52% prefer new music over repetition, and 75%
would like to see more low-power alternative radio stations for diverse
sources); see also Eric Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, SALON.COM, Apr. 30, 2001
(discussing Arbitron studies that show a 15% decline over a seven-year period
and that many young listeners tune in to less radio because of "commercial
overload"), at http://dir.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/04/30/clear-channel/
index.html.
98. David Hinckley, "Free" Radio Launches 250G Satellite Killer, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2002, http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/
ent radio/story/21186p-20105c.html.
99. See Boehlert, supra note 31.
100. Corporate owners pool their advertising staff, package clustered mar-
keting programs, and run their operations out of a single regional office. See
Mathews, supra note 31, at Al.
101. Katy Bachman, Rock Jocks Fighting to Not Fade Away, MEDIAWEEK,
Sept. 30, 2002, at 9.
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jockey with a prerecorded announcer.102 Commercial airtime in
some markets fills twenty minutes of an hour.0 3 Radio advertis-
ing rates dramatically increased throughout the late 1990s.
10 4
In 2001, radio advertising generated $16.7 billion in revenue.0 5
1. Clear Channel's Role in Consolidation
Since deregulation, Clear Channel Communications has
grown larger than any other parent company of radio sta-
tions. 1 6 In 1995, Clear Channel owned forty-three radio sta-t• 107
tions; by January 2003, Clear Channel owned or operated
1253 radio stations. Clear Channel has also reserved the
right to purchase further stations in the event that local owner-
ship caps are lifted.10 9 Clear Channel owns many popular top-
102. Under Clear Channel's "Prophet" system, radio disc jockeys prerecord
their broadcasts and edit segues between songs to play in several markets.
Randy Dotinga, "Good Mornin' (Your Town Here)," WIREDNEWS, Aug. 6, 2002,
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,54037,00.html.
103. Boehlert, supra note 97.
104. Leslie P. Norton, Fading Signal? After Nine Years of Stunning
Growth, Clear Channel May Be Facing Static, BARRON'S, Mar. 6, 2000, at 34.
105. Sean Piccoli, Radio Static: Clear Channel's Dominance of Both Broad-
casts and Live Concerts Has Some Music Industry Players in an Uproar, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2002, at 1G, 2002 WL 100403071 (citing
DUNcAN'S RADIO MARKET GUIDE). Clear Channel earned nearly one-fifth of
the total market share at $3.5 billion. Id.
106. Clear Channel owns more than 10% of all radio stations and has
merged with more than seventy companies. Paul Farhi, Mega Hurts: Clear
Channel's Big Radio Ways Are Getting a Lot of Static These Days, WASH.
POST, May 29, 2002, at C1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A23996-2002May28. Clear Channel is also a global leader in outdoor ad-
vertising. See Diane Eicher, The Growing Reach of King Kong: How Clear
Channel Created a Radio, Concert Behemoth, DENy. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at
101, 2001 WL 27671485. The outdoor advertising unit claims its strategic lo-
cations reach over 50% of Americans and over 75% of Hispanic Americans.
Clear Channel Outdoor, Why Clear Channel Outdoor?, at
http://www.clearchanneloutdoor.comcorp/default.asp (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
107. Clear Channel Communications, Our History, at http:ll
www.clearchannel.com/company-history.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
108. Clear Channel Communications, Radio, at http:l!
www.clearchannel.com/radindex.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). A major
Clear Channel acquisition was 460-station AMFM for $24 billion in 2000.
Boehlert, supra note 97. In some American markets, Clear Channel broadcasts
from international transmitters outside FCC ownership regulations. Mathews,
supra note 31. In San Diego, Clear Channel has "exclusive licensing agree-
ments" with Mexican radio stations allowing Clear Channel to make all pro-
gram and sales decisions. The FCC has no control over transmitters located in
Mexico. Id.
109. Eric Boehlert, Is Clear Channel Playing a "Shell Game"?, SALON.COM,
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market stations and is the largest owner of stations broadcast-
ing a rock format.1 °
Critics argue Clear Channel has reduced programming di-
versity."' An important factor in evaluating programming di-
versity is the presence of minority owners. 112 To Clear Chan-
nel's credit, they agreed to sell off forty radio stations to
minority owners to comply with a major merger agreement. 13
There are doubts, however, that the sales will produce diverse
broadcasts because Clear Channel retains control of many of
the sold stations' broadcasts and ad revenue."'
2. Radio Revenue
While radio generates a majority of its revenue from adver-
tising, airplay decisions constitute another, more controversial
source of revenue. A broadcaster can be paid to play particular
material, but only if a disclaimer is aired."' For decades, record
labels skirted the disclaimer requirement by using independent
promoters to funnel cash into radio stations and ensure their
Nov. 20, 2001, at http://archive.salon.com/ent/clearchannel/2001/11/20/
fcc complaint/.
110. Boehlert, supra note 97. Clear Channel also owns the Premiere Radio
Network (Premiere). Id. Premiere produces concert and music specials and
syndicates popular radio shows by Rush Limbaugh, Dr. Laura Schlessinger,
Jim Rome, and Casey Kasem. Id. Clear Channel withdrew syndication in
markets where Premiere programs ran on non-Clear Channel stations and
placed them on newly purchased Clear Channel stations. Id.
111. See Cline, supra note 96 (stating stations pursuing efficiencies have
created "cookie-cutter formats, predictable song schedules, and a reduction in
local on-air talent"). But cf., Piccoli, supra note 105, at 1G.
[T]he radio practices that critics dislike most pre-date Clear Chan-
nel's rise: segregating music by genre or target audience; operating
tight playlists that give DJs little or no freedom to experiment with
song selection; relying on research in which test audiences choose
songs based on seven-second snippets; hyping radio festivals; working
with consultants who take fees from record companies to shop songs
to individual stations.
Id.
112. Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard, Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, In the Matter of the Applications of Sharehold-
ers of AMFM, Inc. and Clear Channel Communications, Inv. for Consent to
Transfer of Control of AMFM Texas Licenses Limited Partnership, et al.
(2000), http://ftp.fcc.gov/speeches/kennard/statements/2000/stwekO7O.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
113. Brad Kava, Biggest Radio Mogul Bending Rules to Get Bigger?, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 8, 2001, http://www.nrcdxas.org/articles/ccjs.html.
114. For instance, one Walnut Creek station sold to minority owners sim-
ply simulcasts a San Jose Clear Channel station. Id.
115. 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (2000).
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songs are in the play rotation.' Industry insiders estimate
that, by the turn of the decade, record companies were spend-
ing $150 million annually on independent promoters.117 Inde-
pendent promoters allow stations to operate under the guise of
listener preference" 8 while labels for airplay privately bankroll
them." 9
Consolidation tipped the playing field in the pay-for-play
relationship in favor of station owners.' 20 In the summer of
2002, Clear Channel and Radio One began using exclusive
promoters 2' that required labels to pay higher fees. 122 In Octo-
ber 2002, Cox Radio stopped using promoters and some labels
began to resist paying promoters. 22 In April 2003, in response
116. Boehlert, supra note 89. Promoters monitor stations' weekly rotations.
Pretextually, promoters' payments to stations give them access to the stations'
research and playlists. If the stations add songs, the promoters collect set fees
from the record labels. Id. Stations, however, add very few songs into their ro-
tation. See Eric Boehlert, Fighting Pay for Play, SALON.COM, Apr. 3, 2001
(stating "most current music-based stations add roughly 150 new songs each
year to their playlist"), at http:/dir.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/04/03/
payola2/index.html; see also Marc Schiffman & Sean Ross, Does Radio Con-
solidation Equal Less New Music?, BILLBOARD, Sept. 14, 2002, at 79, (finding
the mean number of added songs on a station were three per week, but no sta-
tion averaged over six new songs per week). Labels recognize that "the radio
conglomerates ... have the clout to launch a song simultaneously in scores of
markets across the country-or to consign it to oblivion." Chuck Philips, Music
Industry to Call for a Federal Probe of Radio Payola, L.A. TIMES, May 23,
2002, at Cl.
117. Philips, supra note 116.
118. Boehlert, supra note 89 (noting "stations want to maintain the illusion
that they sift through stacks of records and pick out only the best ones for
their listeners").
119. One Clear Channel promoter comments, "It's product placement ....
At the grocery store, it's common for companies to pay to have their products
placed on the shelf. So why is it that what is a common business practice any-
where else is looked at like taking an Uzi out at a McDonald's?" Cline, supra
note 96. Eric Boehlert responds to a similarly posed hypothetical: "[R]adio isn't
really retail-that's what the record stores are. Radio is an entity unique to
the music industry. It's an independent force that, much to the industry's cha-
grin, represents the one tried-and-true way record companies know to sell
their product." Boehlert, supra note 89.
120. Chuck Philips, Clear Channel's Radio Pacts Irk Labels, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2002, at C1.
121. Id. Radio One owns a large share of the urban music formats. Id. Rock
and pop format promoters pay up to $250,000 annually to be a station's exclu-
sive promoter. Id.
122. Id. at Cll (noting that promotion price increases in markets range
from 25% to 100% depending on the urban market).
123. Marketplace Morning Rep.: Some Radio Chains Severing Ties to Re-
cord Business Middlemen, (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast, Oct. 23, 2002), 2002
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to congressional scrutiny, Clear Channel did an about-face from
its exclusive contracts and announced that it would no longer
use independent promoters, but would forge relationships di-
rectly with the labels like COX.12 4 Critics believe that Clear
Channel's decision to forego independent promoters is little
more than a public relations move that will allow a new more
direct form of pay-for-play to emerge.125
Station owners also exert pressure on labels, and in turn
the label's artists, through listener appreciation concerts. Lis
tener appreciation concerts showcase the station rather than a
particular band. The concerts usually involve several play-list
acts, each performing only a few songs.2 7 Stations expect musi-
cians to perform for free or below market rates. 28 In 1998, there
were approximately 200 radio-sponsored concerts.'2 9 Even be-
fore the Clear Channel-SFX merger, critics believed radio-
sponsored concerts involved coercive business practices."'0 Now
that the industries are vertically integrated, conditioning air-
play on concert performances can be a regular leverage tactic of
station owners.13
WL 4431364; see also Marc Schiffman, Indie Promotion Relationships Shifting,
BILLBOARD, Nov. 2, 2002, at 3, 2002 WL 102117771. Cox, as a smaller parent
company, hoped not using independent promoters would encourage labels to
"forg[e] even stronger ties directly with [their] stations." Fair Disclosure Wire,
Cox Radio, Q3 Earnings Conference Call (Oct. 30, 2002), 2002 WL 100546648.
124. See Press Release, Clear Channel Communications, Clear Channel
Cuts Ties with Independent Promoters (Apr. 9, 2003), http:l!
www.clearchannel.com/documents/press-releases/20030409_corp-indies.pdf.
125. Greg Kot, Clear Channel's Communications Decision Doesn't Necessar-
ily End Pay-for-Play, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Apr. 14, 2003, 2003
WL 1882488.
126. Ray Waddell, Country Acts Rely on Radio Concerts: Shows Seen As
Useful, But Approach "Pay for Play" Scenario, BILLBOARD, Dec. 2, 2000, at 5.
The listener appreciation concert, as a marketing concept, had its genesis at a
1989 charity show sponsored by Los Angeles FM station KROQ. See Chuck
Philips, Radio Pushes Bands for Freebies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at Al.
127. Kelly Barbieri, Radio Concerts-Friend or Foe?, AMUSEMENT Bus.,
June 18, 2001, at 6, 2001 WL 21586784.
128. Waddell, supra note 126, at 5; see also, Barbieri, supra note 127, at 6
("When creating a festival event, the talent is usually the most cost-consuming
aspect. This is often not the case with radio concerts because of the airtime
leverage built into the offer."). One promoter notes, "[Slometimes it is implied
that if the record company provides the act for free or at a greatly reduced
rate, they will receive an add or airplay." Waddell, supra note 126, at 21.
129. See Philips, supra note 126.
130. See id.
131. See infra Part III.C.
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B. CONCERT CONSOLIDATION
The concert promotions industry was born in the 1960s and
began consolidating in 1996.132 The consolidation of the concert
industry was the brainchild of radio station owner Robert F.X.
Sillerman. The similarities to the radio industry made con-
certs an ideal business venture.3 Sillerman sold his radio sta-
tions to start SFX Entertainment, a conglomerate of concert
promoters and venues. During its first eighteen months, SFX
spent nearly one billion dollars to acquire concert promotional
firms that owned or had exclusive rights to venues in nearly
thirty states.36 By 1999, SFX had spent two billion dollars on
consolidation, 37 allowing it to "put on more than 25,000 events
at 120 venues."1 38 To consolidate, SFX went deeply into debt.
13 9
The debt, however, gave SFX control of the booming concert in-
dustry that generated $1.6 billion in revenue in 2000.140
SFX's national consolidation swallowed local promotions
132. See Richard Harrington, A Concert Promoter Out to Steal the Show?,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1998, at B1.
133. Id.
134. Id. Sillerman recognized the concert industry, like radio before con-
solidation, was composed of many small regional groups. Id. Sillerman be-
lieved that regional concert promoters never maximized their advertising
revenue. Id.
135. Jim DeRogatis, SFX Shakes Up the Music Scene, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1999, at 6, 1999 WL 6524158. "Anticipating the radio industry deregu-
lation that followed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, SFX went on a mas-
sive buying spree, acquiring 71 stations. In 1997, it sold them for a staggering
$2.1 billion." Id. SFX's entry into concert promotion began in October 1996. Id.
136. Matthew Goldstein, Event Promoter Upstages Its Rivals with Rapid
Growth: SFX's Tactics Raise Antitrust Questions, CRAIN'S N.Y. BuS., Nov. 23,
1998, at 4, 1998 WL 8018404. Sillerman focused on buying regional promoters
who "owned ampitheaters or had long-term leases with arenas and theaters."
G. Brown, Promoter Packs Punch in Metro-Area Market, DENV. POST, Nov. 11,
2001, at 41.
137. Brown, supra note 136.
138. Seth Sutel, Companies to Work in Concert, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 1,
2000, at 1, 2000 WL 4283367. In 1999, 60 million people attended SFX events.
Joan Harrison, Clear Channel Exploits the Synergies Between Radio and Live
Events, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May 1, 2000, at 20. In 2000, SFX con-
trolled thirty-one venues in the top fifty markets. Norton, supra note 104, at
31.
139. Consolidation Conundrum: Is Bigger Necessarily Better?, MUSIC BUS.
INT'L, Apr. 1, 2000, at 9, 2000 WL 22205135 (noting SFX losses in "1999 had
declined marginally from $68.7m in 1998 to $63.9m, while its revenue had
jumped from $889.9m to $1.68bn").
140. Ray Waddell, Concert Biz Is on the Road to Success, BILLBOARD, May
19, 2001, at 22. The revenue from 2000 was 25% higher than the previous
year. Id.
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businesses and reinvented the concert industry around na-
tional tour packages."' Historically, artists negotiated shows in
each city with local promoters14 1 who operated several venues in
a region that varied in size. 4 1 SFX, however, offered artists
high guarantees under their new business model,44 and in an
industry where revenue splits already favored the artists.
4 1
Competitors allege that SFX, with its enormous financial back-
ing, took losses on events to ensure long-term market control.
4 6
Large payouts to artists necessitated that SFX and its competi-
tors focus on generating ancillary revenue from parking, con-
cessions, merchandise, venue restoration, and ticketing fees. 
4 7
Between the promoter's ancillary revenue streams and the art-
ist's high guarantees, concerts have become expensive to the
detriment of the concert-going public. 48
C. THE CLEAR CHANNEL-SFX MERGER
In August 2000, Clear Channel's radio consolidation en-
gulfed concert promotions. Clear Channel, while finalizing its
141. Clifford Pugh, All the World's His Stage: Brian Becker Has Helped
Turn His Father's Company into a Global Megastar of Live Entertainment,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2001, at 8, 2001 WL 23625598. But see Ray Waddell,
Concert Outlook Bright as Biz Weighs Mega-Merger, BILLBOARD, Mar. 11,
2000, at 1 (noting national tours have been around since the 1970s but no com-
pany has had SFX's resources).
142. See Harrison, supra note 138, at 20.
143. See Harrington, supra note 132.
144. Guarantees are the minimum amount of money a promoter will pay
an act per show, with most deals offering a percentage of gross if ticket sales
surpass a predetermined level. Waddell, supra note 141. Guarantees in the
early 1990s were "in the $100,000-$300,000 range, but beginning [in 1999,]
$400,000-$500,000 per show guarantees from SFX and other national tour
producers became commonplace, and talk of $1 million-plus per show has even
surfaced." Id.
145. See Harrington, supra note 132 (noting that 60/40 revenue splits (art-
istlpromoter) grew to 95/5).
146. Waddell, supra note 141 (reporting that a competing promoter at Jam
Entertainment says in some markets SFX makes a high bid as a loss leader).
147. See Harrison, supra note 138, at 21-22. For a discussion of venue res-
toration fees, see Ray Waddell, Mounting Concert Ticket Surcharges Provoke
Dissent, BILLBOARD, May 26, 2001, at 1, 2001 WL 10795390. For a discussion
of SFX's exclusive agreement with Ticketmaster, see Dean Johnson, Industry
Mulls SFX's Next Move, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 20, 1998, at S25, 1998 WL
7361465.
148. From 1996 to 2001, concert ticket prices rose 73%. See Maureen
Dezell, Is Bigger Better?: In the Entertainment Business Clear Channel Is Eve-
rywhere, and Critics Say that Is the Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2002, at
L1, 2002 WL 4108248.
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AMFM merger, 149 simultaneously purchased SFX. 150 The SFX
merger received standard Department of Justice attention and
drew concern from only a few senators.1 5 1 At the merger an-
nouncement, Clear Channel executives noted the similarity of
the industries and the great opportunity for cross-promotions.
SFX anticipated boosting event attendance by 15% through ra-
dio promotion. 1
53
In July 2001, the concerts division was renamed Clear
Channel Entertainment. "5 Clear Channel Entertainment gen-
erated approximately 70% of U.S. concert ticket revenue in
2001.155 In 2001, concert attendance per show declined from
2000, and revenue only increased 3%, but threats of terrorism
in the final quarter particularly hurt live events.156 By 2002,
concert ticket revenue for major touring acts increased 20%
from 2001 to $2.1 billion."7 In late 2002, during a period of par-
ticularly poor concert revenue, rumors briefly circulated that
Clear Channel was considering selling its entertainment divi-
sion."' This was at the same time Clear Channel was rumored
to be considering aggressively entering the British radio mar-
149. See discussion supra note 108.
150. Clear Channel bought SFX for $3.3 billion and assumed $1.1 billion in
debt. Epstein, supra note 91, at 27.
151. See Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, Senators Query Clear Chan-
nel/SFX Merger, BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 19, 2000 WL 12309543.
152. See Norton, supra note 104, at 31. Randy Palmer, Vice President of
Investor Relations at Clear Channel, stated, "They'll be going from a $3 billion
marketing cap to a $30 billion-plus marketing cap with the combined [compa-
nies]." Ray Waddell, SFX, Clear Channel Resculpting, BILLBOARD, Aug. 12,
2000, at 1 (alteration in original) (quoting Randy Palmer), 2000 WL 24844929.
153. Consolidation Conundrum: Is Bigger Necessarily Better?, supra note
139, at 9.
154. Ray Waddell, Clear Channel Retiring SFX Brand Name, BILLBOARD,
July 21, 2001, at 4, 2001 WL 31109053.
155. Clear Channel, http://www.clearchannel.com/ent div-music.php (last
visited Oct. 6, 2003). According to Clear Channel's Web site, "The Music Group
currently owns, operates and/or exclusively books 135 live entertainment ven-
ues, including 41 amphitheaters in the U.S. and 30 venues in Europe." Id.
156. Ray Waddell, Global Touring Sees Gains in Grim Year: 2001 in Re-
view, BILLBOARD, Dec. 29, 2001, at 5, 2001 WL 31109163.
157. Jennifer Ordonez, U.S. Music Sales Fall Again, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
2003, at A8.
158. Tim Arango, Clear Sale-ing: Media Giant May Dump Its Entertain-
ment Unit, N.Y. POST, Nov. 11, 2002, at 29, 2002 WL 102527026. Even if Clear
Channel were to sell its entertainment division, antitrust concerns would re-
main because the division's share of the industry is so large. Additionally, the
rumored interested buyers already have an interest in the industry. See id.
648
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ket."9 Clear Channel has denied the rumors of plans to sell its
entertainment division,'60 and in late December 2002 the enter-
tainment division's second in command left the firm. Clear
Channel's leadership restructuring was made amidst industry-
wide decreases in gross revenue and attendance at the per-162 he2
show level. By the second quarter of 2003, however, the en-
tertainment division was again rising as revenue increased by
9.2% to $675.9 million.' 63
Since the merger, Clear Channel Entertainment, like its
sibling radio operation, is under legal scrutiny. Clear Channel
Entertainment currently faces antitrust litigation in the United
States District Court of Colorado.' In that suit, Denver pro-
moter Nobody in Particular Presents (NIPP) alleges that Clear
Channel's three Denver rock stations create a monopoly over
rock radio airplay in the region. 16 Specifically, the complaint
claims that Clear Channel's radio and concert practices consti-
tute an unlawful tying arrangement under Sherman Act sec-
tion 2.66 Additionally, NIPP alleges that Clear Channel forces
musicians to select its concert promotions through threats of
losing radio airplay. 67 NIPP also alleges Clear Channel's radio
infrastructure allows the company to employ unfair market
leverage in concert promotions." The problem is not only in
159. See Dominic O'Connell, U.S. Media Giants Fight to Buy Capital Ra-
dio, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 2002, at 16, available at 2002 WL
102105916.
160. Ray Waddell, Touring Strong, but Some Numbers Cause Concern:
2002 in Review, BILLBOARD, Dec. 28, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 102118965.
161. Jeff Leeds, California Exec Leaving Clear Channel Entertainment
Unit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2002, at C2, 2002 WL 103227032.
162. See Waddell, supra note 160 (noting that in 2002, the average per-
show revenue gross decreased 8.5% and that the average per-show attendance
decreased 10.6% in the past year, and was down an ominous 25% in the past
three years).
163. Jesse Hiestand, Clear Channel Boosts 2nd-Qtr Profit, HOLLYWOOD
REP., July 30, 2003, at 8, 2003 WL 57154446.
164. Concert Promoter Sues Clear Channel for Antitrust Violations,
ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 22, Dec. 2001, at 22.
165. See Clear Channel Complaint, supra note 56, 29, 30, 42. The suit
also alleges that Clear Channel buried NIPP advertising for a popular rock
concert and that instead of running a ticket promotion, the prize tickets were
given to the station employees. Id. 51-52; see also Eric Boehlert, Suit:
Clear Channel Is an Illegal Monopoly, SALON.COM, Aug. 8, 2001, at
http://archive.salon.com/ent/clearschannel/2001/08/08/antitrust/.
166. Clear Channel Complaint, supra note 56, I 59-82.
167. Id. 1 44.
168. Id. 45; see also Boehlert, supra note 97 ("Record company executives
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Denver, either, but exists throughout the country.9
D. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RADIO AND CONCERT
CONSOLIDATION: COMPETITION IN RADIO AND CONCERT
INDUSTRIES ACT OF 2002
Recently, the vertical integration of the radio and concert
industries has received attention from Congress. In June 2002,
Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold introduced the Competition
in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002.170 The bill died in
are particularly resentful about how Clear Channel stations leverage their
playlists to make sure its SFX concert-promotion division lands certain
tours."). The NIPP complaint alleges that part of Clear Channel's strategy is
to offer artists exorbitant guarantees, greater than 100% of the gate revenue,
to ensure artists sign on with Clear Channel. Clear Channel Complaint, supra
note 56, 49. Then, when competing promoters are completely eliminated,
Clear Channel will make profits by paying less to artists who at that point
would have no other option. Id. A competing promoter told Billboard, "It's not
just [offering] the extra airplay and extra promotion, it's also the inverse of
that-less airplay and less promotion if they don't sell their tours to Clear
Channel." Ray Waddell, Touring Industry Faces Turbulent Times, BILLBOARD,
Sept. 8, 2001, at 5, 2001 WL 24691834.
169. In Ohio, a concert promoter told Salon the following: "Clear Channel
comes into markets and says to record companies, 'Don't give that station a
concert or band promotion or there will be no business with us across our plat-
form of stations."' Boehlert, supra note 97. Apparently on more than one occa-
sion bands not agreeing to promote concerts with Clear Channel have been
pulled off Clear Channel stations over several states. Id. In Cincinnati, Clear
Channel Entertainment promoted a Blink-182 concert through a competing
radio station, since Clear Channel had no rock station in the market. Eric
Boehlert, Rock '' Radio Rumble, SALON.cOM, Aug. 8, 2001, at
http://archive.salon.com/ent/clearchannel/2001/08/08/riverbend/. At the con-
cert, the competitor's employees disparaged Clear Channel stations while on
stage. Id. In response, Clear Channel allegedly stated it would never promote
a concert with that station again and threatened to nationally pull Blink-182's
music from Clear Channel's stations. See id. Clear Channel was also involved
in concert litigation even before the SFX merger. In 1996, a Texas promoter
accused Clear Channel of tortious interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage. See Small Business Assistance Corp. v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc.,
210 F.3d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 2000). Allegedly, a Clear Channel DJ contacted the
Def Jam music label and threatened to not play Montell Jordan or any other
Def Jam artist if Jordan performed at a competing radio station's festival. Id.
at 280 n.2. Jordan performed, but the competing promoter claimed Clear
Channel interfered with the event's success. See id. at 280 nn.3-4. The Fifth
Circuit reversed a lower court decision because the promoter did not prove
Clear Channel's actions caused damages. Id. at 280-81. The incident, how-
ever, demonstrates the potential power Clear Channel wields as a gatekeeper
of radio even though the court did not address whether Jordan's radio airplay
decreased following the incident.
170. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002, S. 2691,
107th Cong. (2002).
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2002, but was reintroduced in both the Senate and the House
in 2003, where it remains in committee. 7' The bill addresses
several problems with the consolidation of the radio and con-
cert industries 172 and seeks to "facilitate an increase in pro-
gramming and content on radio that is locally and independ-
ently produced, to facilitate competition in radio programming,
radio advertising, and concerts, and for other purposes."' 3
Although the bill addresses issues throughout the industry,
its primary target is Clear Channel.7 4 The bill prevents radio
stations that own concert promotion firms from leveraging
power across both industries to reduce diversity of content.
The legislation also limits a parent company's market advertis-
ing share to 35%. 176 Concerning local regulation, the bill pro-
poses to freeze the current limits. 7 The bill also proposes new
oversight of the radio industry's audience measures and deter-
mination of local markets. 178 Additionally, the bill prevents ra-
dio stations formally licensed to one company to be operated by
a different company.1 79 It also addresses pay-for-play issues by
requiring that radio stations disclose indirect payments for
song airplay over the air." To enforce its provisions the bill au-
thorizes the FCC to revoke the licenses of stations that violate
171. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act, S. 221, 108th Cong.
(2003); H.R. 1763, 108th Cong. (2003).
172. Introducing the bill, Feingold noted, "The Telecommunications Act of
1996 opened the floodgates for concentration in the radio and concert industry
.... We need to repair the damage that has been done through this anti-
competitive behavior." Press Release, Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Intro-
duces "Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act": Promotes Legisla-
tion to Help Independent Radio Station Owners, Promoters and Consumers
(June 27, 2002), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/releases/02/06/
062702medcon.html.
173. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002, S. 2691.
174. Piccoli, supra note 105 ("In June, Clear Channel became the unnamed
but obvious target of a bill in Congress.").
175. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002, S. 2691,
§ 3(e)(3)A-D.
176. Id. § 4(b)(1)-(2). For a discussion of the current local radio ownership
limits, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
177. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002, S. 2691,
§ 4(c)(1).
178. Id. § 5.
179. See id. § 6.
180. Id. § 7. Although Clear Channel has stopped using independent pro-
moters, the issue of payments is still relevant if a direct relationship with the
labels is formed. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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antitrust laws.' 8'
IV. ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIES' CONSOLIDATION
AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Analyzing consolidation in the concert and radio industries
involves both horizontal and vertical market concerns. Each in-
dustry consolidated under a series of horizontal mergers. 82 Ver-
tical integration occurred when station owners acquired other
music promotion outlets.'83 Both vertical and horizontal con-
solidations create competitive harms, but both forms of consoli-
dation also promote efficiencies. In particular, vertical integra-
tion facilitates structural synergies to advance new business
strategies across operations.
A. ANALYSIS OF RADIO CONSOLIDATION
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to fa-
cilitate competition. 84 Lifting the national ownership limit al-
lows large parent companies to form and provide better content
to a wider audience, which makes radio more competitive vis-A-
vis other forms of media."5 Thus, because it can produce several
efficiencies, radio consolidation does not warrant per se illegal-
ity review of its competitive effects. 86 Instead, an evaluation of
the competitive significance of ownership concentration re-
quires a rule of reason analysis, i.e., balancing procompetitive
efficiencies against anticompetitive harms.18' The radio indus-
try consolidation produced much competitive efficiency: en-
hanced use of economies of scale, heightened ability to tailor
marketing campaigns, and more efficient use of on-air time.
Consolidation also produced many anticompetitive harms:
market oligopolies, coercive behavior, redundancy in on-air con-
tent, and alienation of radio's listener marketbase. This subsec-
tion outlines these efficiencies and harms in more detail.
181. Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002, S. 2691, § 3.
182. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
183. The following are examples of such music promotion outlets: concert
venues, concert promoters, tour production teams, and radio-program syndica-
tion companies. See supra Part III.C.
184. See supra note 29.
185. See supra note 31; see also supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text
(discussing growth in the size of parent companies).
186. See supra notes 60, 62 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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1. Competitive Efficiencies Produced by the Radio Industry
Consolidation
An efficiency produced by the radio mergers is the parent
companies' ability to exploit economies of scale in the strategic
use of employees, offices, marketing, and promotional cam-
paigns.'88 Centralization allows for dramatic cuts in transac-
tional and overhead costs. 189 Clear Channel's ability to broad-
cast simulcasts brings bigger radio talent to smaller markets
with a leaner payroll. 9 ° Although streamlining broadcasts does
not increase diversity of programming,'9' it does use payroll dol-
lars more efficiently.
2. Anticompetitive Harms Produced by the Radio Industry
Consolidation
Consolidation, however, also generates anticompetitive
harms. The degree of concentration of advertising revenue is
particularly startling; each regional market is controlled by anS 192
oligopoly of parent companies. Companies purchase advertis-
ing from a small group of owners, and musicians must forge re-
lationships with this same small group to gain airplay. Thus,
radio consolidation facilitates more coercive behavior by parent
companies against labels and artists. Parent companies recog-
nize they can leverage their access to the airwaves to coerce la-
bels and artists in the form of pay-for-play and play-for-play
because they have no comparable means to promote their ma-
terial. 193
Theorists have suggested consolidation encourages format
188. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
191. Some theorists suggest that diversity of broadcasts would naturally
occur as a product of consolidation. See, e.g., DiCola & Thomson, supra note
95, 8-9. These theorists argue that a parent company that owns several sta-
tions in a market would not duplicate formats; this would allow each station it
owns to grab the largest audience in its demographic. Id. A station with a
well-defined share of an audience demographic is attractive to advertisers. See
supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Oligopolies also exist within
station formats. DiCola & Thomson, supra note 95, at 38 tbls. 3-9 (noting that
seventeen of nineteen BIA formats are controlled by oligopolies and listing
Clear Channel as a part of fifteen of those oligopolies). The study finds oligopo-
lies exist in every format measured three different ways. Id. at 39.
193. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
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diversification. 94 A recent study suggests, however, that many
parent companies are redundant in their formatting to corner a
market.'95 This move makes logical business sense: some for-
mats target a demographic that buys more expensive items,
whereas other formats target a larger percentage of the radio
listening population. For instance, many commuters listen to
the radio while driving to work. Thus, it is likely that auto-
related advertising will be more effective and certain demo-
graphics are more likely to buy cars than others. Format diver-
sity is also not likely because unique content cuts against bene-
fits realized from economies of scale, i.e., sharing research and
on-air talent.
In conclusion, it appears that radio consolidation's greatest
benefits are gained from economies of scale. Currently, only the
largest parent companies reap these benefits, but they could
spawn further efficiencies industrywide. In contrast, the many
new broadcast formats do not actually offer diverse content.
9 6
The aggressive business practices consolidating parent compa-
nies do not encourage market competition, but instead actually
cause a detriment to the public. Consolidation allows a few
parent companies to generate significant advertising revenue,
but these profits do not justify the inflated costs borne by ad-
vertisers and the public uproar over radio content. 97 If radio's
audience continues to erode, consolidation's efficiencies will be
nonexistent and irrelevant.
B. ANALYSIS OF CONCERT PROMOTION CONSOLIDATION
Concert consolidation requires a rule of reason analysis
rather than a per se illegality analysis because, like radio con-
solidation, it has also generated some market efficiencies.' 98
The consolidation of the concert promotion industry produced
several efficiencies: the use of economies of scale in national
tours, the exploitation of venues with exclusive booking rights,
and the ability to market products to large captive audiences at
concerts. The consolidation of the concert promotions industry
also produced several anticompetitive harms: the loss of knowl-
edgeable concert promoters from the industry to noncompete
194. See supra note 191.
195. See DiCola & Thomson, supra note 95, at 50-51.
196. See id. at 54-55 (noting that at three different points in time there
was an "[olverlap of almost half of the songs being played between formats").
197. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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clauses, a disproportionate focus on arena touring, the loss of
local content and attention to market uniqueness, and higher
ticket prices for the consumer. This subsection outlines these
efficiencies and harms in more detail.
1. Competitive Efficiencies Produced by the Concert Industry
Consolidation
SFX recognized the concert industry's fragmented nature
as an opportunity to consolidate, 9 9 and exploited economies ofS•200
scale by refocusing the industry on a national tour model.
This model produced efficiencies by reducing transactional
costs in creating tours. The impact of these efficiencies in con-
certs, however, is not as palpable as those created in radio.
Many costs remain following consolidation, e.g., staffing local
venues, promotional work for each performance, and of course,
the artist's live performance cannot be voice-tracked.'
Part of SFX's heightened profitability is the product of ac-
quiring promoters with exclusive rights to, or ownership of, cer-
tain venues. 2 This meant SFX never had to negotiate the costs
of booking a venue. This also allowed SFX to offer artists full
face value of tickets as a guarantee, a technique that allowedSFX o oubid " J 203
SFX to outbid competing promoters.
SFX improved commercial concert revenue by recognizing
audiences were captive consumers.! This revenue came from
venue endorsements and commercially sponsored tours.2 9 The
ability to attract wealthy corporations' promotional campaigns
came from SFX's national touring model,0 which guaranteed
that popular artists would play for large audiences in venues
where the advertising would be displayed.
2. Anticompetitive Harms Produced by the Concert Industry
Consolidation
Some of the same things that produced the greatest effi-
199. See supra note 134.
200. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
201. Unless the artist is lip-syncing, but of course the artist still must be
there to perform.
202. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
204. See Harrington, supra note 132 (noting that audiences at concerts are
"demographically self-selecting groups" ideal for marketing).
205. Id.
206. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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ciencies in the concert promotions industry also generated the
greatest harms. A long-lasting harm was SFX's use of
noncompete provisions in the agreements made with promoters
who sold their operations to SFX. °7 These covenants not to
compete removed the most established and knowledgeable
promoters from the industry, and replaced them with profit-
focused, but shortsighted, businesspeople who were unfamiliar
with the intricacies of the national and local music industry.
Another harm to competition came from SFX's primary fo-
cus on securing arenas.2° These larger venues are appropriate
to book established artists in the prime of their careers, those
artists likely to bring in the highest ticket prices. Although this
model provides a clear incentive (i.e., to get the most people
paying the highest ticket price), it does not account for develop-
ing artists.
In the past promoters helped to develop an artist's local fan
base. °9 Promoters would bankroll the less profitable shows of
developing artists with the profits from more popular shows.
Now, however, small promoters usually cannot promote the
most popular shows-either because fiscally they cannot match
Clear Channel's guarantees, or because physically they cannot
book a Clear Channel exclusive venue. Without bands develop-
ing along traditional lines (i.e., through the touring circuit,
beginning with small venues), a false sense of limited new
touring talent is created.
The consumer pays higher ticket prices because of concert
promotions consolidation. One of the biggest harms from con-
solidation has come in the form of lower concert attendance.210
The national tour model focuses on very large arenas. Thus,
only a few artists secure very high guarantees. 211 The cost of
these guarantees is then passed on to the consumer, as the
most popular artists receive nearly the entire face value of at 212
ticket . The public associates concerts with high price tags,
and thus is less likely to attend, especially the concerts of un-
known artists.
207. Ray Waddell, New Players Emerge in Unstable Touring Biz,
BILLBOARD, Apr. 27, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 10067232 (noting that
many SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment noncompetes will soon expire).
208. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 132, 138 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 162.
211. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, the long-term harms outweigh the benefits
of the concert industry's consolidation because the new busi-
ness model fails to invest in the industry's future.
Postconsolidation concerts are priced to discourage attendance
at multiple concerts yearly, while simultaneously encouraging
a false sense of limited available talent.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF THE RADIO
AND CONCERT INDUSTRIES
Consolidation and cross-ownership have vertically inte-
grated the music promotion industries of radio and concert. The
merger of these closely related industries generated several
procompetitive efficiencies, but also created several anti-
competitive harms. A rule of reason antitrust analysis of the
Clear Channel-SFX merger requires balancing the efficiencies
against the harms. There are several touted efficiencies in the
vertical integration of the industries: cross-promotion, en-
hanced national product marketing, simplified tour manage-
ment for artists, decreased transactional costs, concentrated
knowledge within the industries, and streamlined market op-
erations. There are also several anticompetitive harms of verti-
cal integration: the dramatic concentration of ticket revenue go-
ing to Clear Channel, price discrimination in advertising, a
decrease in the quality of the knowledge base, a shift away
from long-term market development, and most importantly, the
emergence of coercive cross-industry tying. This subsection out-
lines these efficiencies and harms in more detail.
1. Competitive Efficiencies from the Vertical Integration
of the Concert and Radio Industries
A widely publicized claim in Clear Channel's merger with
SFX was the tremendous possibility of cross-promotion to en-
hance economic efficiencies in both operations.213 Clear Chan-
nel's outdoor214 and radio network 15 could promote concerts;
concerts, in turn, would enhance radio station visibility and in-creae litene" 1J211
crease listener loyalty. Clear Channel broadcasts also include
213. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 106.
215. "'In many cases event promoters work with radio stations... buying
advertising and organizing ticket giveaways.'" Epstein, supra note 91, at 27
(quoting an unidentified Clear Channel spokeswoman).
216. "'Our radio stations have always sponsored concerts and other live
events because it helps build listener loyalty.'" Id. (quoting an unidentified
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unique live content provided from Clear Channel Entertain-
ment-promoted concerts. Clear Channel furthered internal
cross-promotions by renaming SFX to Clear Channel Enter-
tainment, 17 which allowed it to advertise its radio on competing
stations, labeling live events with a "Clear Channel presents"
tag.
There are, however, strong arguments against the benefits
of cross-promotion. Clear Channel has limited advertising time
(although it is rising) to sell on its stations.2 8 Assuming Clear
Channel is offering Clear Channel Entertainment a better deal
on advertising rates than competitors, there are opportunity
costs. For example, some advertisers want to buy time on Clear
Channel radio and are willing to pay market rates. Instead,
Clear Channel takes a smaller payment from its internal divi-
sion.
Besides cross-promotional benefits, Clear Channel's control
over popular artists' national tours allows for new advertising
opportunities. Clear Channel can package billboards, radio, and
live events for its clients. This integration also reduces the
transactional costs.
Clear Channel elevates SFX's "one-stop shopping model"
not only for advertisers, but also for the artists by packaging
219
advertising and promotional opportunities across platforms.
A Clear Channel-affiliated artist can book his whole tour along
with the publicity events (on-air appearances, contests, and
ticket giveaways) at one time. This enhances the artist's profile,
reduces costs, and quickly focuses an artist's promotional cam-
paign at a national level. Clear Channel will have an invest-
ment in that artist's radio airplay in every city where his tour
SoS220stops.
°
Clear Channel reduces its payrolls by pooling the talent of
both industries. By crossing platforms, Clear Channel employ-
ees in both concert and radio can share relevant industry re-
search data more easily, make more informed decisions, and do
this at lower transactional costs. Consolidation by centralizing
operations also eliminates middlemen in the promotion's indus-try, ~g.,bookng .22
try, e.g., booking agents. 'Additionally, Clear Channel main-
Clear Channel spokeswoman).
217. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
219. See Pugh, supra note 141.
220. See supra note 169.
221. See Barbieri, supra note 127.
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tains all of the efficiencies SFX gained through exclusive rela-
tionships with venues.222
2. Anticompetitive Harms from the Vertical Integration
of the Concert and Radio Industries
The fact that Clear Channel generates a 70% share of
ticket revenue raises monopolistic concerns.223 In addition,
there are price signs suggesting monopolistic harms: radio ad-
vertising rates are increasing despite no corresponding increase
in advertising audience, 224 and price discrimination is occurring
with stations popular with males.225
Mismanagement is another sign of market power abuse. It
is particularly apparent in Clear Channel's concert operations.
Concerts continue to draw smaller crowds while turning profits
that rely on higher ancillary revenue streams.226 At some Clear
Channel events, the number of passengers in a car determines
the parking fee.227 Clear Channel recognized, as SFX previously
had, that the arena market could withstand price inflation be-
cause there was little competition. This integrated business
model not only is responsible for costly tickets, but also reflects
the shortsightedness of its managers.
Consolidation in the music promotion industries also hurts
artist development. Clear Channel's business model focuses on
short-term gains in the touring industry. With few open spots
for new music on tightly controlled play lists, it is increasingly
difficult for new artists to enter the airwaves. 28 Upstart touring
bands have difficulty attracting audiences outside their home-
town because they do not get airplay. Since there are so few
emerging bands, the touring industry must rely on older estab-
lished acts to play the largest venues. Occasionally, several
bands (that may each only have one song on the air) play a con-
cert together in the form of a radio festival.229
The introduction of several music formats actually con-
222. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
224. Norton, supra note 104, at 31, 34-35.
225. Mathews, supra note 31 (noting higher advertising rates for auto deals
on male-oriented stations as compared to female-oriented stations in San
Diego).
226. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
227. See Dezell, supra note 148.
228. See supra note 116.
229. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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stricts the public's exposure to new music and more experimen-
tal music. This counterintuitive result occurs because, rather
than viewing music content as an end in itself, the music for-
mat views it as a means to maximize ad revenue by appealing
to a particular demographic.230 Consolidation enhances a sta-
tion's ability to control what the public hears on the radio or at
a live concert. If one owner holds most of the stations in a par-
ticular music format for a region, it is safer for the station to
remain consistent in its play list. By only adding a few new
songs, the station does not risk offending an advertiser or los-
ing a regular listener who likes to hear familiar artists and
songs. While this makes sense to a certain point, the public, or
a portion of it, may want to hear new artists too.
231
Clear Channel's massive layoffs cut their knowledge base
of the music industry. Many disc jockeys and promoters who
understood local tastes and intricacies were released, or signed
noncompete agreements and left the industry.232 It is no sur-
prise that advertising takes precedent over content given this
loss of valuable history. Moreover, allegations suggest Clear
Channel also places advertising revenue before the law.233
a. Illegal Tying Offense
The decline in radio audience and concert attendance in-
creases the attractiveness of exploiting artists and labels to en-
hance profitability.234 Some of the greatest anticompetitive
harms from consolidation are the strategic arrangements that
exploit preexisting problems, such as arrangements that bring
the label closer to, and make it more dependent on, the radio
owner: pay-for-play and play-for-play. 23 5 The independent pro-
moter never was a good thing for the diversity of music on the
radio, but exclusive arrangements running to particular radio
stations make the potential harm even greater. Record labels
are coerced into paying for airplay, and are also coerced into
playing at the same radio station's concert. These payments
suggest that the labels view access to radio and touring not just
as a desired product, but as an essential product.
230. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 102, 207 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the pending
antitrust litigation against Clear Channel).
234. See supra notes 96, 162 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
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Clear Channel's concentrated radio ownership allows it to
employ anticompetitive tactics, such as leveraging radio airplay
to foreclose competition in concert promotions. The allegations
suggest Clear Channel promises an artist radio airplay on the
condition that she tours with Clear Channel.236 This appears to
be easy one-stop shopping for some artists and their labels, 7
but it can become a coercive unfair business practice for others,
including artists that do not wish to tour with Clear Channel,
new talent without enough visibility to tour with Clear Chan-
nel, and the few remaining regional concert promoters.
b. Per Se Tying
In order for Clear Channel to commit a per se tying of-
fense, it must control two separate products, have market
power in the tying product, and offer artists no choice but to
work with Clear Channel tours (or not tour), so as to have a
substantial impact on commerce in the touring industry."' Ra-
dio station airplay and concert promotions are two separate
markets." Clear Channel's tying product is radio airplay; the
tied product is concert promotions.
For per se analysis to apply, Clear Channel must have
market power in radio.2 0 The relevant market in radio mergers
is the market share of radio advertising revenue,24' making it
tempting to rely exclusively on a market share analysis. That is
shortsighted, however, because concert promotion has inter-
changeable substitutes and radio content is unique.242 There are
other sources for promoting a concert-newspapers, fliers, di-
rect mailings, and the Internet. These forms are not nearly as
efficient as radio, although proper use of the Internet and e-
mail may someday be the ideal method of promotion. The real
issue is not advertising, but airplay. Could artists with no his-
tory of radio airplay be able to draw profitable crowds? No.243
Clear Channel controls the content of radio; this matters
236. See supra Part III.C.
237. See Pugh, supra note 141.
238. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 52, 56 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
243. There are artists no longer receiving airplay, however, who can sell
out tours from an established fan base. Susanne Ault, Web Is a Windfall for
Touring Biz, BILLBOARD, Dec. 21, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 102118677.
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because concerts, like radio, have target audiences. Promoters
advertise on stations reaching an interested audience, i.e., sta-
tions already playing the artist or similar music. Thus, a pro-
moter does not advertise a hard rock concert on the easy
listening, beautiful music, or talk radio formats. This type of
tying requires looking at the appropriate submarket 244 -
stations that play an appropriate music format and advertise to
an appropriate audience demographic. Currently Clear Chan-
nel owns a majority of the stations that play the formats of
touring acts-rock and pop.245
Still the relevant market (or submarket) must also align
geographically, i.e., Clear Channel must have the market
power of the radio stations in the area where airplay is condi-
tioned on concert promotions. Clear Channel can change a sta-
tion's format at any time.24 ' A profit-maximizing firm would not
consolidate a cluster around a single format, however, because
owners would be pitting their stations against each other and
not achieving the greatest advertising share. 4 ' Notwithstand-
ing the merits of having several formats, Clear Channel's ideal
business model should incorporate only touring music formats
in markets where it owns venues.149 Therefore, NIPP's predic-
tions of format concentration in other geographic markets be-
sides Denver 250 are plausible and likely if local ownership limits
are removed.251
244. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
245. Piccoli, supra note 105 ("Clear Channel controls a majority of the radio
channels in America playing the two genres that have long dominated the con-
cert circuit: Top 40 and rock.").
246. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
247. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (holding that
the FCC does not have to consider format changes in renewing licenses).
248. Clear Channel's use of particularized formats strengthens their busi-
ness model in three ways. First, formatization makes it very easy to package
sales to retailers interested in reaching the core demographic of the radio sta-
tion and increase advertising revenue. See supra notes 93-94 and accompany-
ing text. Second, once a format proves financially successful it can quickly be
recreated in a different geographic market-from the jingles and nicknames
right down to the disc jockeys. See supra note 102. Third, the creation of sev-
eral narrow formats allows the conglomerate a tool to fight off allegations that
radio content is less diverse.
249. Of course since local ownership rules divide radio by FMAM caps, the
use of AM radio in talk formats is an appropriate substitute because few tour-
ing bands are played on AM radio.
250. See Carlye Adler, Backstage Brawl, FORTUNE SMALL Bus., Mar. 4,
2002, at 170(C).
251. In fact, FCC data already suggests a slight downward trend in the
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Both the radio broadcast and concert promotions industries
have significant barriers of entry. Radio stations are limited to
a finite number.52 Promoting large concerts depends on radio
publicity and access to appropriate venues to host events. Clear
Channel operates most venues under exclusive contracts."'
Thus, upstart competing promoters must make expensive in-
vestments in new venues. Even if a competitor builds a venue
in a Clear Channel-dominated radio market, he relies on Clear
Channel airplay of artists on their tours. Clear Channel Com-
munication's broadcasts of these advertisements, and its air-
play of the same artists, establish the only viable shows apt to
fill concert seats.
The final element of a per se tying analysis requires evalu-
ating how susceptible concert promotions are to monopoliza-
tion. 54 Concert promotions' dramatic consolidation under SFX,
Clear Channel's outstanding promotional market share, and
the industry's high barriers to entry demonstrate how close the
concert industry is to being a monopoly.
Thus, a per se analysis is warranted in regions where
Clear Channel exclusively controls venues, is the predominant
station owner of relevant formats, and requires touring with
Clear Channel (if a band is touring) in order to get airplay. If a
per se analysis applies, then the tie is illegal. Even in those ar-
eas where these conditions do not exist, under a rule of reason
analysis there appear to be no efficiencies that Clear Channel
could realize from this tie other than foreclosing competition in
the promotions industry.
Even if Clear Channel were to refrain from the tying be-
havior, the degrees of concentration and their closely related
nature suggest that a nationwide integration of the two indus-
tries, as is, threatens competition. The enormous power that
Clear Channel controls in radio airplay will remain until radios
are uncommon in cars. Indeed, there is a possibility that soon
satellite feeds and wireless Internet will be the preferred
method for music distribution and promotion. As the industry
number of formats in larger markets and a slight upward trend in format
number in small markets. See supra note 95.
252. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
253. See Brown, supra note 136, at 41 (stating that Clear Channel Enter-
tainment owns and operates approximately 135 live entertainment venues).
254. The court must determine whether the tying condition has a substan-
tial impact on the tied industry. See supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
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stands now, radio and concerts are the primary forms of music
promotion. Therefore, any co-owner of a predominant market
share in both industries occupies a uniquely powerful position.
Despite the numerous economic efficiencies that the merger
creates, the anticompetitive harms (particularly in the long-
term outlook of the industry's inability to offer new music)
speak against allowing such a merger to stand.
V. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND PROPOSALS
FOR IMPROVEMENT
In technologically dynamic industries, it is often suggested
that antitrust intervention is too late and past the point where
it will have any positive effect on the industry. Radio and tour-
ing have undergone massive changes in their business models
since the passage of the 1996 Act, but they are not so different
as to prevent any effective regulation.
In the past, the FCC actively regulated vertical integration
in radio; early on, concerns revolved around the networks' pro-
duction of programming. Under today's Department of Jus-
tice and FCC standards, vertical integration is not afforded the
256same attention. The concert industry developed well after ra-
dio, thereby foreclosing any explicit references to it under
original FCC guidelines.25 ' The Court, however, recognized that
the FCC's purpose was to manage evolving problems in the in-
dustry.25 The concert and radio industries similarly promote
artists to generate advertising revenue; the industries' activi-
ties intersect at several points. Some advocates of greater regu-
lation of vertical cross-industry ownership argue reform must
be tailored to each industry and the specific activities that re-
strain trade.259
In part, agency oversight needs to be more predictive in
analyzing radio/concert mergers. The FCC already examines
260radio content using format analysis and audience measures.
It should be able to recognize the unique capabilities of radio
airplay and analyze the impact of radio ownership's interaction
255. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
259. Robert Weissman, Divide and Conquer: Restraining Vertical Integra-
tion and Cross-Industry Ownership, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, Oct./Nov. 2002, at
16.
260. See, e.g., MASS MEDIA BUREAU, supra note 86.
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with closely related industries. Of course, the Harvard School
illuminates the danger of overprediction. 261 This danger,
though, does not warrant turning away from common sense
reasoning: combining two highly concentrated industries cen-
tral to music promotion greatly increases the potential for
harmful restraints on trade. The post-Chicago approach to ver-
tical integration merger analysis suggests the same. How much
coercive behavior is occurring and how difficult is it for a new
competitor to enter the industry? These questions address how
far a company can grow and whether it can create monopoly
prices.
The Feingold bill is an important piece of legislation be-
cause it brings attention to the most pervasive problems in ra-
dio and concert promotions. The bill's enforcement provisions,
262 th
which authorize the revocation of licenses and the freezing of
local radio ownership limits,26 3 are particularly attractive. The
problem with freezing local ownership to current levels is that
the largest markets are already clustered.264 With eight stations
in the largest markets, Clear Channel can easily concentrate
radio formats to best match the touring industry. The bill also
could go further in developing methods for guaranteed local ac-
cess and increasing diversity on the radio. The bill's proposed
stiffening of FCC regulations regarding pay-for-play265 and
clearly limiting station ownership266 are favorable signs, never-
theless. The dangers of vertical integration are real, which
makes the Feingold bill more relevant now than ever, as the
FCC rulemakers continue to loosen the grips on vertical inte-
gration in the media.2 7
There are several drastic solutions. We could eliminate
commercial radio altogether, but this is unrealistic and ineffi-
cient. Another possibility is to split the merger of SFX and
Clear Channel and return the two industries to their separate
but consolidated forms. That proposal is also unrealistic and
inefficient. Clearly, there are several economic efficiencies that
encourage changing business strategies to advance productiv-
ity. Another less drastic, but still potentially chilling solution is
261. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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to divide the national structure into a series of competing re-
gional companies. That solution, however, might just create a
series of new monopolistic firms, each with greater power than
the smaller fragmented regional competition.
A workable proposal is to adopt the Feingold bill while de-
veloping a calculation of other relevant music media outlets
into local ownership concentration. Thus, if a company has a
certain percentage of the radio share, it can only have a limited
corresponding share of concert promotions. This regulation
would open up both the concert promotion and radio businesses
to new entrepreneurs. It could be overseen by FCC regulations
for license issuing and renewal. The regulation might also
encourage venue owners and station owners to pursue other
forms of music and potentially include more local content.
CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed a handful of
companies to acquire most of the profitable commercial radio
bandwidth. Concentration of station ownership in rock and top-
40 formats gave Clear Channel enormous control over the con-
tent of popular music broadcasts. While radio underwent mas-
sive consolidation, so did the concert promotion industry. Clear
Channel's vertical integration of these two now-concentrated
industries concerns competitors in radio and concert promo-
tions, on-air broadcast talent, record labels, musicians, and
fans alike.
Radio airplay and live concerts are the primary means to
promote commercial music. The lax monitoring of the vertical
integration of these closely related industries has fostered a
business model that encourages aggressive business practices
and ultimately harms competition in both industries, dampens
innovation, and hurts the profitability of the music industry as
a whole.
Government intervention in the concert promotions indus-
try to correct anticompetitive harms is appropriate because
concert promotions is not a dynamic technology-driven indus-
try. Even though SFX changed industry operations, the
changes are not irreversible. Government intervention in con-
certs requires addressing the industry's unique relationship
with the radio industry. This can be done by carefully evaluat-
ing particular radio formats, geographic metro-markets, and
the availability of alternatives to station-owned (or station-
controlled) venues. Regulators must account for these struc-
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tural factors to best meet the FCC's public interest standard, to
insure the health of the arts, and to provide the public access to
diverse and antagonistic media sources.
Antitrust enforcement agencies must stifle anticompetitive
behaviors now to protect the long-term health of the music in-
dustry. The lessons from Clear Channel can be applied broadly
to the current media ownership rules debate. Thus, in future
highly concentrated vertically integrated media-industry merg-
ers, courts must employ some predictive analysis to prevent de-
structive behavior that is highly foreseeable. After all, catching
a monopoly at its incipiency prevents social harms before they
occur.
